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Abstract
According to contemporary Millianism the semantic content of an ordinary proper
name is simply its referent. In his recent book Beyond rigidity Scott Soames elaborated
a new version of millianism. He claimed that some linguistically complex names such
as Professor Saul Kripke or Princeton University have partially descriptive semantic
content. In addition to their unique referents, these names are always associated
with a special kind of description. I argue in this paper that Soames’s theory of
partially descriptive names fails, because descriptive contents can be found only in the
background knowledge of competent speakers.
1. Introduction
Defenders of the traditional Millian doctrine often say that the seman-
tic content of an ordinary proper name is simply its referent. According
to this popular view a particular nonmetaphorical, nonironical utterance
of a declarative sentence s with a proper name n expresses semantically
the information that the speaker is primarily concerned to communicate
about the referent of n. That is to say that in normal everyday contexts
proper names contribute to the asserted communicative information ex-
clusively with their referents. In addition, contemporary Millians claim
that in such cases the asserted information content of a declarative sen-
tence is a singular or “Russellian” proposition. The most distinctive
feature of singular propositions is that they contain objects and persons
and their properties as constituents. Accordingly, in (1), the expressed
singular proposition contains both the person Kripke and the property
of living in Princeton.
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(1) Saul Kripke lives in Princeton.
The somewhat metaphorical term “contains” means here that relative to
the actual world the proposition is in fact about Kripke and the property
of living in Princeton. In other words: the proposition attributes a real-
world property to a real-world person.
It is of great theoretical importance that in singular propositions
the individual constituents are directly represented, without mediation
of any further qualities. So in (1) the name Saul Kripke contributes to
the expressed proposition only with the person to whom it in fact refers.
In this specified sense of semantic content proper names pick out their
real-world referents directly and never contain additional qualitative or
descriptive informations.
According to a slightly reformulated Millian view, defended recently by
Soames (2002) and mentioned in agreement with him by Sullivan (2003),
there are however interesting exceptional cases to this rule. Soames
(2002) offers a detailed argument to show that certain Millian names
have a twofold semantic structure. Although linguistically simple proper
names typically do not contain any descriptive information, some com-
plex names such as the phrases Princeton University or Professor Saul
Kripke are regularly associated with descriptive properties that apply
only contingently to their bearers. Soames introduced the notion par-
tially descriptive names to deal with these complex phrases.
The semantic structure of partially descriptive proper names consists
of two separable parts. On the one hand, as ordinary Millian names all
such names have in the actual world a unique referent. On the other
hand, they are associated with contingent descriptive information. The
semantic content of a partially descriptive name includes therefore both
a nondescriptive and a descriptive component. The nondescriptive com-
ponent—the referent of the partially descriptive name n—is the histor-
ically or causally determined object o. This means that the object o,
which stands at the beginning of a historical or causal chain of trans-
mission of the name n, is initially determined by an ostensive baptism
or by a descriptional stipulative naming. The descriptive component—
the contingent property Pc attached to the object o—is specified in every
particular case by the referential intentions of speakers, who utter declar-
ative sentences with the name n. On Soames’s view these two compo-
nents play a parallel and complementary role in fixing the reference of
the partially descriptive name n. It is supposed furthermore that the
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descriptive component is of substantial semantic importance, because it
has a reference-fixing role in a long-term sense. Once the referent has
been fixed, every competent speaker in the future who utters declarative
sentences in normal circumstances with the name n, will attach the con-
tingent property Pc to o. Thus Pc remains permanently associated with
the name as a timeless descriptive reference-fixing definition.
It is clear at first sight that Soames’s train of thought results in
a hybrid theory, which aims to reconcile essential antidescriptivist and
descriptivist insights concerning the semantics of proper names. This
procedure is an ambitious research program in itself, surely, but I do not
think that Soames’s theory in its present form succeeds. In the following
brief comment, I will give an argument that purports to show the main
flaw in his reasoning.
2. Competence conditions for partially descriptive names
Let us first consider what governs our everyday linguistic behavior when
we utter simple declarative sentences with ordinary proper names. Be-
cause of the great variety of communicative situations where proper
names usually occur, and because of the possible diversity of speaker
intentions in these situations, the question of the governing principles of
everyday usage seems to be extremely complicated, but, fortunately, we
can concentrate here on two salient and theoretically significant features
of our linguistic practice.
The first obvious thing to say about everyday usage is that if speakers
are to speak about an object or person, they must have a discriminating
cognitive fix on the thing or person. It is tempting to explain this obvious
fact by holding that from the point of view of speakers, the cognitive
mechanism of discriminative fixing functions as a background condition of
successful communication. Maybe, this discriminative ability can be seen
as the necessary cognitive precondition for using words with referential
power even in general. If so, then in the case of ordinary proper names this
means that to use such names as Princeton or Saul Kripke successfully,
speakers must have the corresponding cognitive intentions to discriminate
the city and the person to which these names respectively refer.
Beyond discriminative intentions speakers must also have some reflec-
tive linguistic capacity to count as competent with the public information
content of proper names. The need for this second cognitive condition
seems to be equally obvious for the simple reason that in declarative sen-
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005
306 zoltán vecsey
tences ordinary proper names stand in general in subject position. There
are, of course, relatively often used sentence forms where names occupy
other syntactical places. Sometimes personal names may seem to occur
predicatively, as, for example, in the sentence This smart guy is Saul
Kripke. Names may appear naturally in an isolated position, too. In
answering customary interrogative sentences, such as Who is this smart
guy?, speakers could use personal names as syntactically unstructured
one-word replies. But apart from these clear exceptional cases, in the
vast majority of situations where a speaker uses the name n in simple
declarative sentences to refer to the object o, she uses n in subject po-
sition to indicate which thing she is trying to convey information about.
There is a schematic empty sentence form n is F , which must be filled in
every case with a name and a property for the concrete utterance to say
something definite. It follows from this that it must be known to speakers
at least implicitly what it takes in normal contexts to assertively utter
sentence tokens which contain proper names in their subject positions.
That is, to be able to say of the referent (the object o) of n that it
has the property F-hood speakers must be equipped with some reflective
syntactic knowledge. Consider sentence (1) again:
(1) Saul Kripke lives in Princeton.
(1) expresses the singular proposition that predicates the property of
living in Princeton of Kripke. Therefore, speakers must reflectively un-
derstand that in all normal contexts by assertive utterances of (1) they
are attributing to the referent of Saul Kripke the property of living in
Princeton.
With similar considerations in mind, Soames mentions the following
two competence conditions for ordinary proper names.1
C1. Speakers must possess referential intentions that determine o as the
referent of n in normal conversational situations. This communica-
tive intention may arise either from a direct epistemic source (intro-
ducing an expression to name the object o, on the ground of personal
acquaintance with o) or from an indirect linguistic source (intending
to refer to the object o by way of linguistic reference).2
1 See Soames (2002, 65).
2 In what follows I will ignore the difference between epistemic and linguistic sources
of referential intentions.
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C2. With respect to a given context, speakers must realise that with
assertive utterances in the form n is F they say about the referent
of n (about the object o) that it is F .
In my opinion, there is something deeply and indisputably right in the
formulation of these two conditions. C1mirrors the intuitively right point
of the externalist theories of intentionality that successful de re linguistic
reference with singular terms requires always individuating mental inten-
tions. C2 invokes the plausible epistemic idea that (implicit) reflective
knowledge about the functioning of the sentence scheme n is F counts as
a prerequisite for assertively uttering sentences in a given context with or-
dinary proper names. Reading C1 and C2 together as an integral whole,
we can see what traditional Millianism says at a fundamental level about
competence conditions concerning proper names.
What complicates matters a little bit, however, is the fact that in
contrast with ordinary proper names partially descriptive names are syn-
tactically structured linguistic entities. If we are prepared to agree with
Soames’s original hybrid theory, then we must suppose that these names
have also certain competence conditions. Now what would be involved in
the competence conditions of partially descriptive names? Soames seems
to forget to discuss this important question.3 Before I try to fill this gap,
consider the following short list of examples:
Grammatical Types of Partially Descriptive Names
(A) Princeton University, Yankee Stadium.
(B) Whidbey Island, Snoqualmie Falls.
(C) Professor Saul Kripke, Princess Diana.
(D) Miss Ruth Barcan, Mr. Terry Thomas.4
Here, in each case a proper name occurs as part of a noun phrase. In (A)
and (B) we see ordinary proper names which are followed by common
nouns. In (C) the phrases are structured of course in reverse order.5 Be-
yond this superficial syntactic remark, the decisive question is, I think,
how these different phrasal constituents interact semantically. The an-
3 This is a striking deficiency of his book, because he analyses the behavior of
descriptive names in three different chapters.
4 All examples stem from Soames (2002).
5 For ease of discussion I abstract here from the somewhat problematic type (D).
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swer seems to be perfectly straightforward: the interaction of ordinary
proper names and common nouns in noun phrases yields semantic mix-
tures or semantic amalgams. If partially descriptive names are really
genuine proper names, then they contribute to the propositional content
of declarative sentences only with their referents. Thus, they are rigid
designators in the classical Kripkean sense. In possible worlds similar
enough to our actual world the phrase Professor Saul Kripke, for exam-
ple, always refers to the same person, if it designates anything at all,
since the name Saul Kripke is rigid. But, as Soames suggests, partially
descriptive names behave, strictly speaking, not rigidly, because the kind
of content they semantically express includes also contingent properties
of their referents.6 That is, in the phrase Professor Saul Kripke the com-
mon noun professor is a nonrigid property designator. So there are such
counteractual worlds in the modal space where the very person who in
our actual world is a professor and bears the name Saul Kripke, has an-
other profession, and for that very reason the whole phrase cannot be
classified without further ado as rigid. This modal anomaly arises from
the plain semantic fact that beyond its referent the name contains as ad-
ditional semantic information the contingent property of professorhood.
And the observation generalizes smoothly to the grammatical types from
(A) to (D): there is a built in information mixture to the semantic profile
of the enumerated names consisting in all cases of (i) the rigidly desig-
nated particular objects, and (ii) the appropriate contingent properties
attached nonrigidly to the designated particular objects. To illustrate the
hidden informational structure of these names, Soames gives the follow-
ing general formula: the x: Dx & x = y, where the definite description D
represents the contingent property attached to the referent of the name,
relative to an assignment of the variable y. According to this formula,
the structure of the name Professor Saul Kripke must be analysed in the
following way: the x: x is a professor & x = y, under an assignment of
Saul Kripke to the variable y.7
6 See Soames (2002, 120).
7 Soames (op.cit., 110) says in fact that that the semantic contents of partially
descriptive names are roughly the same as the semantic contents of certain definite
descriptions. It is not entirely clear for me what the adverb roughly means in this
context. If partially descriptive names are synonymous with definite descriptions,
the synonymy relation between them must hold unambiguously.
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If partially descriptive names are structured really this way, it follows
that the previously mentioned two competence conditions C1 and C2
must be complemented by C3, or by something analogous with it.
C3. In using a partially descriptive name n to refer to an object o in nor-
mal conversational situations speakers must permanently associate
the contingent descriptive property Pc with the object o.
At this point, we should accept the thesis, for the sake of argument at
least, that in our actual world under normal circumstances an average
speaker could have cognitive access to the whole semantic content of a
partially descriptive name. Then the main question is whether these
three conditions C1, C2 and C3 jointly show what speakers in our actual
world must know in general to understand and use such names compe-
tently. I am sceptical concerning this question, because the condition
about associated properties poses in my view an insurmountable prob-
lem for Soames’s theory. What I would like to do in the remainder of the
paper is to demonstrate why such a condition as C3 cannot be met.
3. Where does descriptive information come from?
While ordinary proper names represent only their referents, a partially
descriptive name, according to Soames, gets into the process of a partic-
ular conversation with a referent and an associated descriptive property.
Consider what he would say about the following sentence pair, uttered
alternatively in a situation where prior to the time of the concrete ut-
terance both the speaker and the hearer were competent users of the
linguistically simple names Saul Kripke and Princeton (i.e., they satisfy
in advance the requirements of C1 and C2):
(1) Saul Kripke lives in Princeton.
(2) Professor Saul Kripke lives in Princeton.
As for the first sentence, Soames might insist that uttering these words
with declarative intentions a speaker conveys no more content semanti-
cally than the information that the well-known philosopher of language
Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. This seems to be intuitively very plausible
because the sentence contains no overtly indexical expressions or other
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context-sensitive grammatical elements with varying referents from con-
text to context and the contextual value of the present tense of the verb
counts in normal conversational settings as unambiguous, and because we
supposed further that the speaker knew that the hearer has both names
in her mental lexicon.8
It is quite another matter that in special cases an utterance of (1)
could convey possibly more information than just the lean and seemingly
trivial proposition that Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. Agents who know
various significant things about the life story and personality of Saul
Kripke could perhaps know that he does not particularly like the city
Princeton. They could know, perhaps from personal communication,
that Kripke believes that Princeton is not pretty. In this hypothetical
case, an utterance of (1) would imply the descriptive information con-
tent to the addressees that because he now lives there, Kripke probably
changed his negative opinion about Princeton. This putative descriptive
information would belong, however, to the inferential mechanisms em-
ployed in the interpretation of the sentence. According to Soames, who
distinguishes sharply first-order semantic content from other types of as-
serted or implicated information, statements with ordinary proper names
may carry occasionally some descriptive information which goes beyond
the literal meaning of the uttered sentence token. No doubt, sometimes
it is an extremely demanding interpretive exercise to determine precisely
what this extra information content consists of. Soames acknowledges
this, but it is important to see, he says, that this kind of information
could be conveyed solely by second-order pragmatic means.9
The best candidate for being the semantic content encoded by as-
sertive utterances of (1) is thus the mere information that Saul Kripke
lives in Princeton. This is in agreement with other contemporary Millians
like Salmon (1986) and Thau (2002) who would presumably maintain that
in this sentence, under normal circumstances, the linguistically simple
proper name Saul Kripke (and Princeton) lacks any descriptive content.
But what about our second sentence? As C3 suggested above, to
count as competent with the partially descriptive name Professor Saul
Kripke speakers must permanently associate with the referent of the sim-
ple proper name Saul Kripke (i.e., with the person the name rigidly des-
ignates) the contingent property of professorhood. From this it follows
8 For detailed arguments see Soames (2002, 63–5).
9 Soames (op.cit., 86). For a similar view, see Capellen – Lepore (2004).
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52, 2005
the semantic content of partially descriptive names 311
that in our hypothetical situation, where both the speaker and the hearer
are competent users of the simple name Saul Kripke (and Princeton)—
via satisfying the conditions C1 and C2—an assertive utterance of (2), in
contrast to (1), would express the descriptively enriched semantic content
that the well-known philosopher of language Saul Kripke, the professor,
lives in Princeton. Thus, Soames would conclude that in this case the
putative descriptive information is carried by the common noun professor.
4. Descriptive contents in mental files
It seems to me that the aforementioned Soamesian inference cannot be
justified. The decisive reason for this is that the descriptive content of the
property designator professor does not enter necessarily into the asserted
content of (2). I think that being a competent user of the proper name
Saul Kripke in the actual world at a time t amounts to knowing, among
other things, that the designated person is a professor.10
On what grounds can one accept this claim? From a cognitive point
of view, it can be argued that to count as competent with the name
Saul Kripke a speaker must have a separate mental file about the person
Kripke.11 Let us call it the Saul Kripke File. Beyond some mental
pictures, memory-traces of moods and other types of stored information,
the Saul Kripke File will be filled very likely with a great amount of
contingent semantic information. According to the cognitive hypothesis
all contingent semantic content in the Saul Kripke File will be associated
with the name Saul Kripke. For competent users, for example, the sound
of the words Saul Kripke provides access to all semantic information
stored at the moment about Kripke. In this way, speakers may associate
with the name such descriptive contents as he is smart, he has a beard,
10 Recall what condition C1 says: competent users of a proper name must possess
discriminating abilities, that is, they must gain enough knowledge from epistemic
or linguistic sources to pick out the designated object determinately. It is easy
to imagine contexts in which the deferential source of such a name as Kripke in-
cludes regularly a contingent but characteristic feature of the referent. In science
classroom contexts, for example, the first encounter with the name may bring
about in students a latent association between the person who is called Kripke
and the contingent property of professorhood. Kroon would say that this property
becomes “resiliently” associated with the name. See Kroon (2004, 282).
11 About mental files see among others Recanati (1993), Geirsson (2001) and Segal
(2001).
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he is a professor, and so on (if they have placed these linguistic items
previously into their mental files). That is, the associated descriptive
contents help them cognitively track the individual named.
This does not mean, of course, that the name contains in its seman-
tic profile these contingent pieces of information. But when competent
speakers assertively utter sentences in a public language with the proper
name Saul Kripke, they can lean on this previously acquired background
knowledge. In successful cases, a coordinated mental file management
takes place. Thus, the already known properties of the designated per-
son become part of the common ground among the participants in the
conversation. If that is right, then the contingent fact or information
that Saul Kripke is a professor must not be explicitly expressed by nor-
mal utterances of (2). I conclude, therefore, that for competent hearers
(2) expresses the same basic proposition semantically as (1), namely that
Saul Kripke lives in Princeton. To take one more example, consider the
following sentence pair (3) and (4).
(3) Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel.12
(4) Professor Peter Hempel was Professor Carl Hempel.
Here it is even clearer that there could not be a significant difference
between the expressed semantic content of the two sentences. I agree
entirely with Soames’s claims about the possible utterance contents of
(3). It is very likely that an average speaker could use (3) to communicate
different things in different contextual settings. One could assert with (3)
the contextually enriched identity statement, for example, that the man
formerly known by the name Peter Hempel was in fact identical with
the famous philosopher of science Carl Hempel. On another occasion
the sentence might convey the metalinguistic proposition that there was
only one famous philosopher named Hempel, and perhaps there are a
few other real possibilities. According to Soames, however, (3) expresses
semantically no more than the simple fact that the rigidly designated
objects of the two proper names Peter Hempel and Carl Hempel are
identical. And it is easy to see that the first-order content of this identity
relation does not contain any descriptive information. So far so good.
One problem now arising, though, is that contrary to the explicit
expectations of Soames’s theory (4) seems to express semantically the
12 For a detailed analysis of (3), see Soames (2002, 66).
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very same content. If our hypothetical speaker has the required minimal
background knowledge to be a competent user of (4)—that is, she has
a suitable mental file about the person Hempel—she may know, among
other things, that Peter Hempel was at a given time t professor, and she
may also know that he was in fact identical with Carl Hempel. Therefore,
the common noun component professor of the partially descriptive names
Professor Peter Hempel and Professor Carl Hempel will stay, we could
say, in an inert position in her everyday utterances of (4). It changes
the ordinary proper names Peter Hempel and Carl Hempel into syntacti-
cally complex names, but does not provide them with new and significant
descriptive semantic power. This semantic inertness of the property des-
ignator professor shows, in my view, that regarding first-order content
there is no significant difference between (1) and (2), and similarly, (3)
and (4) do not differ in their expressed semantic content.
So it seems that Soames’s general formula the x: Dx & x = y does not
represent accurately the hidden informational structure of these names,
when D is interpreted semantically. This formula should be reinterpreted
in a way which fits better with the cognitive competence conditions men-
tioned above.
5. Conclusion
As we saw before, there are good reasons for Soames and other contem-
porary Millians to accept C3. They are entitled to say that partially de-
scriptive names must express semantically contingent properties of their
designated objects across normal contexts involving competent speak-
ers. We also saw, however, that prior to using such names in declarative
sentences competently speakers must possess some discriminating back-
ground knowledge about their designated objects. This is why I doubt
that there is a direct way to meet condition C3.
It seems likely therefore that the main thesis of Soames’s attractive
theory fails, and partially descriptive names lack semantically valuable
descriptive information; perhaps they are not names at all.13 At the
same time, I am convinced that this failure does not threaten Soamesian
Millianism about ordinary proper names. The above-mentioned two con-
ditions C1 and C2 provide the strongest evidence why this is so. We may
also reject the inherently unstable idea of partially descriptive names and
yet still hang on to traditional Millianism in the case of ordinary names.
13 McKinsey (2004) argues similarly. He claims that Soames has produced no real
examples of partially descriptive names.
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